Money hazards: That 'consulting' job offer may ruin your retirement — and even threaten national security

Retirees with government work experience, or former members of the military, or contractors with expertise in security, technology, or even economics, should be aware of a growing threat.

In an official FBI notice, the agency says foreign intelligence services frequently use professional networking websites, social media platforms, and job boards to identify and target individuals under the guise of consulting or employment, but in reality are seeking to access sensitive information. 

Seemingly harmless work for generous pay

The scenario can be as seemingly innocent as a recently retired military analyst wanting to stay professionally active, who is approached online by someone claiming to represent an international consulting company.

The recruiter praises the analyst’s expertise and offers flexible, remote assignments, writing short reports. The work appears harmless. The pay is generous. The recruiter seemed professional.

The tactic is known as virtual targeting, a strategy that some foreign intelligence services use to find new information sources. Instead of meeting in person, foreign actors use online platforms to identify and recruit individuals with access to sensitive or classified information.

Using false online identities, they may pose as recruiters, consulting firm representatives, researchers, or analysts to establish professional relationships and collect information that supports their intelligence objectives.

Among U.S. foreign adversaries, China is by far the most prolific practitioner.

A recent case resulted in 7 years in prison

Take the recent case of Korbein Schultz, a former U.S. Army intelligence analyst who was sentenced to seven years in prison for conspiring to collect and transmit national defense information, unlawfully exporting controlled information, and accepting bribes in exchange for sensitive, non-public U.S. government information.

An individual posing as a client of a geopolitical consulting firm contacted Schultz via a freelance web-based platform. 

Unknown to Schultz, the individual was a foreign national residing in China. 

This individual solicited Schultz to produce detailed analyses of U.S. military capabilities and planning, particularly regarding Taiwan and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. 

Over time, the individual made demands for increasingly sensitive materials — including technical manuals, operational procedures, and intelligence assessments — in exchange for money. Schultz used his access to restricted databases to download and transmit at least 92 sensitive U.S. military documents. He also tried to recruit a fellow Army analyst into the workflow.

Throughout his engagement with the foreign national, Schultz never met the individual in person but continued to complete tasks and ask for more sensitive information. Schultz was tasked via commercial messaging applications and paid through online payment platforms, removing the need for any face-to-face interactions.

It doesn't require current access to sensitive intel

Even people without current access to sensitive information may be contacted because their education and professional experience could lead to future positions with access to valuable intel.

“Anyone with specialized knowledge or government-related experience may be of interest. Even seemingly routine expertise can help foreign intelligence services better understand U.S. systems and capabilities,” said Roman Rozhavsky, the assistant director of the FBI's Counterintelligence and Espionage Division.

Foreign agents often start the relationship with a simple message offering consulting work or research opportunities.

The next step is building trust. Operatives may begin with basic assignments, such as writing reports or white papers using publicly available information or sharing professional opinions.

These early requests help them evaluate whether the person is willing to cooperate. Payment for these initial tasks helps establish legitimacy and encourages continued engagement.

Over time, requests may become more specific and involve sensitive or non-public information. 

“These relationships often begin with harmless-looking tasks using public information,” according to Rozhavsky. “Once trust is established, the assignments gradually become more specific, more lucrative, and more sensitive.”

In some cases, individuals who become successful sources are encouraged to recruit colleagues, friends, or former coworkers. Their experience, including payments and perks, lends more credibility to the offer.

Avoid a money hazard

• Individuals with security clearances or who worked in sensitive positions should remember they are responsible for protecting certain information even after employment — and that seemingly harmless information can be valuable to foreign adversaries.
• Current clearance holders or government employees should also review their department’s secondary employment policy and ensure they report outside employment when required.
• Anyone offered unexpected remote consulting or employment opportunities should independently verify the company. Be cautious about sharing professional information and remain alert to unusual requests or payment methods.

If you believe a foreign agency has contacted you, stop communicating immediately and report the contact to the FBI at tips.fbi.gov.